16.21. Cyberspace, private spaces, enforcement of rules, and technology


16.21.1. Consider the "law" based approach

16.21.2. The technological approach:

16.21.3. This is a concrete example of how crypto acts as a kind of building material

16.21.4. Virtual Communities-the Use of Virtual Networks to Avoid Government

16.21.5. These private spaces will, as technology makes them more "livable" (I don't mean in a full sense, so don't send me notes about how "you can't eat cyberspace"), become full- functioned "spaces" that are outside the reach of governments. A new frontier, untouchable by outside, coercive governments.

16.21.6. "Can things really develop in this "cyberspace" that so many of us talk about?"

16.21.7. Protocols for this are far from complete

16.22. Data Havens

16.22.1. "What are data havens?"

16.22.2. "Can there be laws about what can be done with data?"

16.22.3. Underground Networks, Bootleg Research, and Information Smuggling

16.22.4. Illegal Data

16.22.5. "the Switzerland of data"

16.22.6. Information markets may have to move offshore, due to licensing and other restrictions

16.23. Undermining Governments--Collapse of the State

16.23.1. "Is it legal to advocate the overthrow of governments or the breaking of laws?"

16.23.2. Espionage and Subversion of Governments Will be Revolutionized by Strong Crypto

16.23.3. "Xth Column" (X = encrypted)

16.23.4. use of clandestine, cell-based systems may allow a small group to use "termite" methods to undermine a society, to destroy a state that has become too repressive (sounds like the U.S. to me)

16.23.5. "Why won't government simply ban such encryption methods?" + This has always been the Number One Issue!

16.23.6. "How will the masses be converted?"

16.23.7. As things seem to be getting worse, vis-a-vis the creation of a police state in the U.S.--it may be a good thing that anonymous assassination markets will be possible. It may help to level the playing field, as the Feds have had their hit teams for many years (along with their safe houses, forged credentials, accommodation addresses, cut-outs, and other accouterments of the intelligence state).

16.24. Escrow Agents and Reputations

16.24.1. Escrow Agents as a way to deal with contract renegging

16.24.2. Use of escrow services as a substute for government

16.24.3. Several people have raised the issue of someone in an anonymous transaction simply taking the money and not performing the service (or the flip side). This is where intermediaries come into the picture, just as in the real worl (bonds, escrow agents, etc.).

16.24.4. Alice and Bob wish to conduct an anonymous transaction; each is unknown to the other (no physical knowledge, no pseudonym reputation knowledge). These "mutually suspicious agents," in 1960s- and 70s-era computer science lingo, must arrange methods to conduct business while not trusting the other.

16.24.5. Various cryptographic protocols have been developed for such things as "bit commitment" (useful in playing poker over the phone, for example). I don't know of progress made at the granularity of anonymous transactions, though. (Though the cryptographic protocol building blocks at lower levels--such as bit commitment and blobs--will presumably be used eventually at higher levels, in markets.)

16.24.6. I believe there is evidence we can shorten the cycle by borrowing noncryptographic protocols (heresy to purists!) and adapting them. Reputations, for example. And escrow agents (a form of reputation, in that the "value" of a bonding entity or escrow agent lies in reputation capital).

16.24.7. if a single escrow agent is suspected of being untrustworthy (in a reputation capital sense), then can use multiple escrows

16.25. Predictions vs. Implications

16.25.1. "How do we know that crypto anarchy will 'work,' that the right institutions will emerge, that wrongs will be righted, etc.?"

16.25.2. My thinking on crypto anarchy is not so much prediction as examination of trends and the implications of certain things. Just as steel girders mean certain things for the design of buildings, so too does unbreakable crypto mean certain things for the design of social and economic systems.

16.25.3. Several technologies are involved:

16.25.4. (Note: Yes, it's sometimes dangerous to say "unbreakable," "untraceable," and "unforgeable." Purists eschew such terms. All crypto is economics, even information-theoretically secure crypto (e.g., bribe someone to give you the key, break in and steal it, etc.). And computationally-secure crypto-such as RSA, IDEA, etc.--can in principle be brute-forced. In reality, the costs may well be exhorbitantly high...perhaps more energy than is available in the entire universe would be needed. Essentially, these things are about as unbreakable, untraceable, and unforgeable as one can imagine.)

16.25.5. "Strong building materials" implies certain things. Highways, bridges, jet engines, etc. Likewise for strong crypto, though the exact form of the things that get built is still unknown. But pretty clearly some amazing new structures will be built this way.

16.25.6. Cyberspace, walls, bricks and mortar...

16.25.7. "Will strong crypto have the main effect of securing current freedoms, or will it create new freedoms and new situations?"

16.25.8. "Will all crypto-anarchic transactions be anonymous?"

16.26. How Crypto Anarchy Will Be Fought

16.26.1. The Direct Attack: Restrictions on Encryption

16.26.2. Another Direct Attack: Elimination of Cash

16.26.3. Another Direct Attack: Government Control of Encryption, Networks, and Net Access

16.26.4. An Indirect Attack: Insisting that all economic transactions be "disclosed" (the "Full Disclosure Society" scenario)

16.26.5. Attempts to discredit reputation-based systems by deceit, fraud, nonpayment, etc.

16.26.6. Licensing of software developers may be one method used to try to control the spread of anonymous systems and information markets

16.26.7. RICO-like seizures of computers and bulletin board systems - sting operations and setups

16.26.8. Outlawing of Digital Pseudonyms and Credentialling + may echoe the misguided controversy over Caller ID

16.26.9. Anonymous systems may be restricted on the grounds that they constitute a public nuisance

16.26.10. Corporations may be effectively forbidden to hire consultants or subcontractors as individuals

16.26.11. There may be calls for U.N. control of the world banking system in the wake of the BCCI and similar scandals

16.26.12. "National security"

16.26.13. Can authorities force the disclosure of a key?

16.27. How Crypto Anarchy Advocates Will Fight Back

16.27.1. Bypassing restrictions on commercial encryption packages by not making them "commercial"

16.27.2. Noise and signals are often indistinguishable

16.27.3. Timed-release files (using encryption) will be used to hide files, to ensure that governments cannot remove material they don't like

16.27.5. The Master Plan to Fight Restrictions on Encryption

16.28. Things that May Hide the Existence of Crypto Anarchy

16.28.1. first and foremost, the incredible bandwidth, the bits sloshing around the world's networks...tapes being exchanged, PCs calling other PCs, a variety of data and compression formats, ISDN, wireless transmission, etc.

16.28.2. in the coming years, network traffic will jump a thousandfold, what with digital fax, cellular phones and computers, ISDN, fiber optics, and higher-speed modems

16.28.3. corporations and small groups will have their own private LANs and networks, with massive bandwidth, and with little prospects that the government can police them-there can be no law requiring that internal communications be readable by the government!

16.28.4. AMIX-like services, new services, virtual reality (for games, entertainment, or just as a place of doing business) etc.

16.28.5. steganography

16.28.6. in the sense that these other things, such as the governments own networks of safe houses, false identities, and bootleg payoffs, will tend to hide any other such systems that emerge

16.28.7. Government Operations that Resemble Cryptoanarchy will Confuse the Issues

16.28.8. Encrypted Traffic Will Increase Dramatically

16.28.9. Games, Religions, Legal Consultation, and Other "Covers" for the Introduction and Proliferation of Crypto Anarchy

16.28.10. Compressed traffic will similarly increase

16.29. The Coming Phase Change

16.29.1. "We'd better hope that strong cypto, cheap telecoms and free markets can provide the organizing basis for a workable society because it is clear that coercion as an organizing principle ain't what it used to be." [Duncan Frissell, in his sig, 4-13-94]

16.29.2. "What is the "inevitability" argument?"

16.29.3. "What is the "crypto phase change"?"

16.29.4. "Can crypto anarchy be stopped?"

16.29.5. Need not be a universal or even popular trend

16.29.6. "National borders are just speedbumps on the digital superhighway."

16.29.7. "Does crypto anarchy have to be a mass movement to succeed?" - Given that only a tiny fraction is now aware of the implications...

16.29.8. Strong crypto does not mean the end to law enforcement

16.30. Loose Ends

16.30.1. governments may try to ban the use of encryption in any broadcast system, no matter how low the power, because of a realization that all of them can be used for crypto anarchy and espionage

16.30.2. "tontines"

16.30.3. Even in market anarchies, there are times when a top-down, enforced set of behaviors is desirable. However, instead of being enforced by threat of violence, the market itself enforces a standard.

16.30.4. Of course, nothing stops people from hiring financial advisors, lawyers, and even "Protectors" to shield them from the predations of others. Widows and orphans could choose conservative conservators, while young turks could choose to go it alone.

16.30.5. on who can tolerate crypto anarchy

16.30.6. Local enforcement of rules rather than global rules

16.30.7. Locality is a powerful concept


Revision #1
Created 23 June 2022 04:03:45 by c0mmando
Updated 23 June 2022 04:04:11 by c0mmando